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I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose a pharmacist refuses to dispense pills that induce abortion 
claiming that dispensing such pills runs counter to principles he holds 
dear.  Indeed, the pharmacist claims that forcing him to dispense the pills 
would violate his freedom of conscience.  He even claims that he would
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not have become a pharmacist had he foreseen an obligation to dispense
such pills at the time he entered the profession.  Should the pharmacist’s 
job be protected if he is making a bona fide claim of conscience?  And 
does it matter whether the pharmacist’s objection to dispensing the pills 
is rooted in religious or nonreligious reasons? 
In The Significance of Conscience,1 Kent Greenawalt, in characteristically 
insightful fashion, discusses a variety of issues about the proper scope 
and subject matter of claims of conscience.  The core of the article, in 
my view, concerns the protection we should give to nonreligious claims 
of conscience relative to religious claims of conscience.  He argues that 
we should generally give comparable treatment to nonreligious claims
but that there are “special reasons” to accommodate religious claims that
ought to factor into our analysis.2 
In Part II, I discuss Greenawalt’s analysis of why religious claims of 
conscience are entitled to at least some special consideration.  In Part III,
I propose a method to avoid, rather than resolve, the difficult issue he 
addresses, at least in a wide variety of contexts.  In short, I describe
“alternative burdens” that can be imposed on those who make claims of
conscience.  These alternative burdens can be structured so that claims
of conscience are likely to be made only when they are sincere or, at the
very least, when claimants would be extremely averse to our refusal to 
provide an exemption.  Moreover, the benefits of using alternative 
burdens can be obtained without having to determine whether the claim 
of conscience is rooted in religious or nonreligious considerations. 
Finally, alternative burdens can be arranged to benefit those who do not 
make claims of conscience, thereby weakening concerns that claims of
conscience are unfair to nonclaimants.
II. GREENAWALT’S ANALYSIS OF SPECIAL REASONS FAVORING 
RELIGIOUS CLAIMS 
Greenawalt discusses but does not necessarily endorse four possible 
reasons why one might give greater protection to religious claims of 
conscience: (1) tradition favors religious claims of conscience, (2) religious 
claims typically have more at stake for the claimant than nonreligious
claims, (3) religious claims of conscience are more likely to be sincere
than nonreligious claims, and (4) governments are less competent to 
 1. Kent Greenawalt, The Significance of Conscience, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 901
(2010). 
2. Id. at 916. 
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deny religious claims of conscience than nonreligious claims.3  As I read
Greenawalt, he seeks more to examine the weight of these reasons than 
to use them to reach a definitive conclusion about the relative merits of 
religious and nonreligious claims. 
A.  Tradition 
First, Greenawalt notes that we might favor religious claims because 
we have “a tradition of some accommodation to religious conscience.”4 
Greenawalt does not reveal how strong he takes this consideration to be 
other than to assert that he finds “the argument from tradition . . . less
powerful for legislative choice than for constitutional permissibility” and
does “not regard it as decisive even in the latter context.”5  I take it that
Greenawalt is ultimately trying to address the issue of whether we ought
to favor religious claims over nonreligious claims.  On that score, our 
traditional deference to religious claims tells us little about what our 
normative commitments should be, though it suggests that religious 
claimants may expect greater solicitude than do nonreligious claimants.6 
B.  Amount at Stake 
Greenawalt also briefly discusses the argument that we ought to favor
religious claims of conscience because “more is at stake for the typical
believer.”7  For example, those who make claims rooted in religion may
believe that they will face severe divine punishment for their transgressions. 
Greenawalt finds the argument problematic because it depends on one’s 
religious assumptions.  “The nonbeliever,” he writes, “may reasonably 
respond that behaving morally in this life matters more for her than for 
someone who is convinced that a loving God forgives all confessed
sins.”8 
Greenawalt is no doubt right that whether a particular claim of 
conscience has more at stake for a religious claimant than a nonreligious 
3. Id. at 913–15. 
4. Id. at 914. 
5. Id.
6. Id.  By “nonreligious claimant,” I mean a person who makes a claim of
conscience that is not rooted in religious beliefs.  A theist can be a nonreligious claimant 
















   
 












claimant depends on the particular situation and beliefs of each claimant.
Nevertheless, it may be the case that more is typically at stake for the 
religious claimant.  If we believe that more is typically at stake for 
religious claimants than nonreligious claimants, we have at least some
reason to favor religious claimants.  But as I will later emphasize, we 
only have reason to favor religious claimants if we cannot otherwise 
evaluate what is at stake for claimants without using religion as a rough
proxy for the claimant’s perceived stake.
C.  Sincerity 
A third reason Greenawalt considers for favoring religious claims is 
that they often provide indicia of sincerity because religious “claimants
usually, though far from always, have been attached to religious 
organizations that share a particular view.”9  So if an Orthodox Jew 
seeks to take a standardized exam on a Sunday rather than a Saturday, 
we are more likely to attribute the request to a genuine claim of conscience 
than to a mere scheduling preference.
Greenawalt would, however, give no special weight on grounds of 
sincerity to religious claims when “the claim of conscience is one that
would be extremely unlikely to be made insincerely.”10  As an example, 
he suggests that “[n]urses are unlikely to refuse to participate in
sterilizations, for example, unless they have a sincere objection because
there is no independent advantage to be gained by nonparticipation.”11 
As I will discuss later, we can help ensure that claims of conscience are 
made sincerely by creating burdens that remove the advantages that 
might otherwise be gained by making claims of conscience. 
D.  Competency To Evaluate 
A fourth reason for favoring religious claims, according to Greenawalt, is
that “the government is not highly competent to evaluate assertions of 
religious truth and should steer clear of them when it can.”12  By  
contrast, “[n]onreligious claims of conscience are more likely either to 
reflect individualized reactions that avoid general claims about truth or
to rest on claims whose evaluation by the government is more acceptable.”13 
So, for example, “[i]f the claimant relies on secular reason to conclude that 
9. Id. at 915. 
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 914. 
13. Id.
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in all circumstances withdrawing life support is killing, the government 
may respond that this view is unreasonable given a dominant opinion to
the contrary within the medical community and among others who have 
thought carefully about the issue.”14 
To evaluate the matter, we need to more clearly distinguish two
different meanings of competency when we speak of the government’s 
competency to evaluate claims.  One meaning concerns the government’s
ability to reach an answer that is epistemically warranted given available 
information.  On this dimension, it is by no means clear that governments 
are better at evaluating nonreligious claims than religious claims. 
Consider ordinary empirical claims first.15  As Greenawalt acknowledges,
“[S]ome general claims based on religious premises may be shown to be 
mistaken by nonreligious reason.”16  For example, he notes that a 
religious believer may “conclude[] that he cannot fight in a war because 
the United States is aiming only to expand its control of oil reserves and
is wantonly killing innocent civilians.  Both of these factual premises 
could be wrong and known to be so by relevant government officials and
well-informed outsiders.”17  So a claim of conscience like this one, 
grounded principally in disputed empirical claims, can be addressed by
the government with about the same level of competency regardless of
whether the claim of conscience is grounded in religious or nonreligious
concerns. 
Other sorts of empirical claims may refer to the beliefs of a group of
people.  For example, a person may claim that his religious community
generally agrees that he must refrain from some activity. Suppose,
however, that he is mistaken.  His religious community, however he
defines it, imposes no such requirement.  In situations like this one, 
government actors (like judges and legislators) do have means of 
assessing the truth.  To uncover the widely shared beliefs of a community of
religious observers, we can explore those tenets just as we would explore 
the principles and beliefs underlying the tenets of some other group, like
the community of organic chemists.  Both investigations concern beliefs
and principles of a community that are not a matter of general knowledge, 
14. Id.
15. By “ordinary” empirical questions, I follow Greenawalt’s usage. Id. at 915
n.20 (“I add the word ordinary to put aside such questions as whether Jesus performed 
miracles and whether his body was resurrected after his death.”).
16. Id. at 914. 
17. Id. at 915. 
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and both are difficult to conduct.  Nevertheless, we routinely evaluate 
beliefs of members of the scientific community in court and in 
legislative bodies and could do the same for evaluations of the beliefs of 
religious adherents.  Courts infrequently analyze dominant religious
opinion, I suspect, not because they are especially incapable of doing so 
but rather because U.S. law and tradition discourage it. 
Government actors can fairly be tasked with evaluating empirical
matters because we have some generally agreed upon methods of
legitimate empirical inquiry.  It is far more difficult to assess government 
competence at evaluating matters of value.  We have no widespread 
agreement about how one ought to assess value claims, so it is especially 
difficult to compare governments’ epistemic ability to assess religiously
laden claims about value to nonreligious claims about value.  In fact, one
might think that the government has some epistemic ability to adjudicate 
claims of conscience that are principally empirical in nature (whether
religious or nonreligious) but that the government ought not adjudicate 
claims of conscience that rely principally on disputed claims of value
(whether religious or nonreligious).
Even if government actors have limited ability to resolve value 
disputes, they nevertheless do make value judgments, explicitly or 
implicitly, all the time. So we seem to have decided that courts and
legislatures are good enough at the task.  But Greenawalt does not give 
us reason to believe that government actors are better, from an epistemic
perspective, at resolving secular value disputes than religious ones.
Interestingly, when Greenawalt asserts that government may be better at 
adjudicating nonreligious claims of value than religious claims of value, 
he gives an example that essentially converts a question of secular value
into an empirical question.  As noted earlier, he writes, “If the claimant
relies on secular reason to conclude that in all circumstances withdrawing 
life support is killing, the government may respond that this view is 
unreasonable given a dominant opinion to the contrary within the 
medical community and among others who have thought carefully about
the issue.”18  The claimant, who purports to have some secular reasons
for thinking that it is always wrong to withdraw life support, is told that 
his view is wrong because it conflicts with the opinions of others who
are said to know more than he does. 
Such arguments from authority do not hold much sway, however, 
against a claim of value.  They also reach the wrong results whenever a 
claim of conscience is, so to speak, ahead of its time.  A city bus driver
18. Id. at 924. 
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who refuses to drive a racially segregated bus ought not cease his 
resistance because leading thinkers in his community, however defined,
see the matter differently.  True, if we convert claims of value to 
empirical claims, government actors may have better tools of analysis.
But the conversions are themselves dubious.  Moreover, if we could
convert secular claims of value to empirical claims about dominant secular 
opinion, then we can presumably do the same for religious claims of 
value.  If a religious claimant believes that it is always wrong to withdraw 
life support, then the government could empirically investigate whether the 
claimant’s view is dominant among knowledgeable members of the
claimant’s religion.  Of course, there will be difficult questions to resolve 
about who constitutes the relevant pool of experts.  But the same is 
frequently true for secular determinations. 
Presumably, judges are more familiar with dominant secular values 
than the values held by the various religious claimants that might enter 
the courthouse.  But we frequently expect judges to understand the 
operation of unfamiliar businesses and areas of science.  We might even
doubt that long-term familiarity with some community’s values contributes 
to expertise in actually making all-things-considered values determinations. 
Granted, it would be quite surprising if the government had precisely
equal epistemic ability to examine religious and nonreligious claims of
conscience.  Overall though, I do not think that Greenawalt has made the 
case that governments are generally more competent, from an epistemic 
perspective, at evaluating one sort of claim than the other. 
Greenawalt’s argument, however, concerns more than just governments’
epistemic abilities.  He also states that a government’s “exercise of
judgment [is] more appropriate, in respect to nonreligious moral claims 
than religious ones.”19  By “appropriate,” I take Greenawalt to mean 
that, independent of governments’ epistemic abilities, there may be
moral or political reasons to discourage governments from adjudicating 
certain kinds of disputes about religion and religious texts.  For example, 
Greenawalt elsewhere discusses nonreligious justifications for religious 
liberty, including the possible claim that “based on political analysis and
history, . . . destructive conflict, suffering, and resentment occur when 
religious groups compete for political favor and the government sticks 
19. Id. at 915. 
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its fingers into society’s religious life.”20  If we accept that claim, we
may indeed have greater reason to avoid adjudicating religious claims of 
conscience than nonreligious claims.  I emphasize only that such 
grounds would be about competency in the sense of “appropriateness” 
rather than competency in the sense of “epistemic ability.” 
E.  Summary 
After walking through the four considerations discussed above, 
Greenawalt writes that “[t]he general lessons to be drawn from this 
analysis are debatable.”21  Although he finds that the reasons to respect 
religious and nonreligious claims are sufficiently similar to warrant 
comparable treatment, he also recognizes special reasons to accommodate 
religious conscience:
I conclude that for most subjects as to which both religious and nonreligious 
claims of conscience about moral requirements are likely to arise, any right of 
conscience should include the nonreligious claims.  That is both because the 
claims are similar enough to warrant comparable treatment and because there is 
some reason to accommodate deeply held convictions even when they are 
demonstrably mistaken.  Nevertheless, the special reasons to accommodate 
religious conscience should be a crucial part of the discussion whether any right 
or privilege should be granted.22 
So, even though Greenawalt recognizes weaknesses in the proffered 
rationales for favoring religious claims and even though he would
recognize nonreligious claims of conscience in many or perhaps even 
most of the contexts in which he would recognize religious claims, he
believes that there are some special reasons to favor religious claims of
conscience.  I have taken issue with some of Greenawalt’s analysis but 
have not sought to refute his central claim.  In the next part, however, I
will suggest that courts, legislatures, and employers can, under a wide 
variety of circumstances, avoid distinguishing between religious and 
nonreligious claims of conscience and still accomplish many of the goals 
that motivate Greenawalt’s analysis. 
III. ALTERNATIVE BURDENS
None of the reasons Greenawalt considers for favoring religious 
claims of conscience imply that religious claims are intrinsically more 
 20. Kent Greenawalt, Diverse Perspectives and the Religion Clauses: An Examination 
of Justifications and Qualifying Beliefs, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1433, 1438–39 (1999). 
 21. Greenawalt, supra note 1, at 915. 
22. Id. at 915–16. 
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worthy than nonreligious claims.  As opposed to arguments favoring
religious observance as itself an important good or as a path to
recognizing divine will, the reasons Greenawalt considers focus on 
likely correlates of religion.  We considered the possibility that, relative 
to nonreligious claimants, religious claimants (1) generally have more at 
stake, (2) are more likely to be sincere, and (3) present claims that are
more difficult or inappropriate for secular governments to analyze.23  But 
even if these are reasonable generalizations, they will sometimes lead us 
astray.
Given that we have only identified rough generalizations about
religious claims, we could engage in more careful case-by-case analysis 
to determine whether the generalization holds in a particular case. If we 
only care about certain characteristics of claims of conscience, we could 
just evaluate individual claims (or perhaps categories of claims) in terms
of the extent to which they have the desired characteristics.  For 
example, for a given claimant, we could consider the claimant’s perceived 
repercussions of failure to receive an exemption, the indicia of sincerity
surrounding the claim, and the difficulties the claim poses for secular
evaluation.  All of these characteristics can be evaluated for both 
religious and nonreligious claims.24 
Absent interests uniquely and directly tied to the religious nature of a 
claim of conscience, for example that the claim actually reflects divine 
will, the only reason for treating religious claims as a category is that it 
is difficult and costly to engage in a case-by-case analysis of all claims
of conscience.  So, for example, rather than evaluating the sincerity of 
every claim of conscience, we might rely on the presumed fact that
religious claims are more likely to be sincere, all else being equal.  One
23. I put aside the claim that, all else being equal, tradition favors religious claims
of conscience.  Although it may be true, it tells us little, if anything, about whether we 
ought to continue to favor religious claims of conscience in the future. 
 24. Greenawalt advocates examining the merits of particular nonreligious claims 
of conscience in at least some contexts. See Greenawalt, supra note 20, at 1473 (“[A]t
least when claims of nonreligious conscience are common and can be feasibly assessed
by a screening process, constitutional considerations of equality require equal treatment.”).
Greenawalt is reluctant, however, to always give nonreligious claims the same opportunities 
to be heard that we give to religious claims.  He states that “courts should not dismiss 
without examination atheist claims that are parallel to religious claims,” id. at 1469, but 
“[t]he law may appropriately require that religious belief or practice be a condition for a
valid claim to exemption from [rules requiring compulsory education or work on the 
Sabbath], instead of providing for individual assessment of the strength of other claims,” 
id. at 1472. 
 927

















   
    
  
   
 
 
    
 
  
problem with such a presumption, however, is that it systematically
favors religious claimants over nonreligious claimants.  It may also lead 
to suboptimal results, when, for example, a nonreligious claim of 
conscience is strongly tied to the claimant’s happiness and sense of self,
has strong indicia of sincerity, and cannot be easily resolved by courts or
other government actors. 
I will highlight a different approach: we can provide alternative 
burdens that claimants must accept in order to be relieved of the 
obligations to which they initially sought exception.  So, to use a familiar
case, if a person drafted into the military claims to be a conscientious 
objector, he could be required to serve the country’s interests in some 
nonmilitary capacity.  As a matter of terminology, I will say that this 
hypothetical claimant faces an “initial burden” (the obligation to provide 
compulsory military service) but is also offered an “alternative burden” 
(to serve compulsory community service).  We have offered claimants
alternative burdens on occasion, but they can surely be offered more
frequently.  Greenawalt has himself endorsed the creation of alternative 
burdens, at least in some contexts,25 and appears to support their more 
frequent availability.26 
A.  Onerous Alternative Burdens 
One way to promote goals Greenawalt treats as desirable is to select
alternative burdens that most people will view as more onerous than the 
initial burden.  Suppose the government has enacted a two-year term of 
mandatory military service during wartime.  If the alternative burden 
provides for two years of mandatory community service, many will view 
it as less onerous than the military service because wartime military 
service carries much higher risks of morbidity and mortality than
community service does.  By contrast, if the alternative burden requires 
25. See KENT GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS OF LAW AND MORALITY 327–28, 330–31 
(1987) (advocating alternatives to compulsory military services and to compulsory taxation
that are “[r]oughly equal” in burdensomeness or even “moderate[ly]” more unfavorable 
than the compelled behavior); 1 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION:
FREE EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS 53–54 (2006) (defending alternatives to compulsory
military service); Kent Greenawalt, Refusals of Conscience: What Are They and When 
Should They Be Accommodated?, 9 AVE MARIA L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (“Let those 
opposed in conscience to paying certain taxes pay the amount owed plus an extra amount 
to some other valuable endeavor.”). 
26. See 2 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: ESTABLISHMENT
AND FAIRNESS 316–17 (2008) (supporting “self-selection” schemes that provide relief
from laws of general applicability by, for example, allowing people to pay for the 
privilege not to wear a motorcycle helmet).
928
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four, five, or six years of mandatory community service, the alternative
burden may be generally viewed as more onerous than the initial burden. 
The onerousness requirement promotes two of the considerations that 
Greenawalt identifies. It reduces the risk of insincere claims of
conscience by giving people less incentive to make bogus claims.  It also
tests the claimant’s aversiveness to the initial burden.  If he is not 
especially averse, the claimant is unlikely to accept what is generally 
perceived as an onerous alternative burden.  Thus, by creating substantial
alternative burdens, we can promote claims that are sincere (or that at
least reflect extremely strong preferences) without having to distinguish 
between religious and nonreligious claims of conscience.27  The 
onerousness requirement also reduces the actual or perceived unfairness
of claims of conscience to those who comply with the initial burden.  To 
the extent that claimants end up with burdens that nonclaimants find
onerous, nonclaimants will not envy claimants and will not consider the 
claimant to have received especially advantageous treatment. 
B.  Beneficial Alternative Burdens 
A second way to promote goals Greenawalt treats as desirable is to 
select alternative burdens that benefit those adversely affected by the
claim of conscience.  Rather than, say, giving people a choice between
accepting the initial burden and going to prison (an onerous but not 
widely beneficial alternative burden we frequently use today) the
alternative burden should be one that produces a net benefit, at least for
those affected by the claim of conscience and preferably for society as a 
whole.  Providing a four-year term of community service to conscientious 
objectors might produce greater social surplus than forcing objectors to
engage in two years of wartime military service that they claim to deeply 
27. The proposal also eases the government’s obligation to closely examine—and 
perhaps be viewed as endorsing—grounds for exemption that many find deeply
offensive.  For example, a number of soldiers have sought relief from duty on grounds of
conscience based on the likely repeal of the military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy. 
See Tamar Lewin, A Hot Line Grapples with Evolving Appeals for Conscientious Objector 
Status, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2010, at A13.  Similarly, at least one female soldier has 
sought relief from duty on the grounds that she is a born-again Christian who has “come
to believe that a woman’s place [is] in the home, raising a family.” Id.  Even if these
particular claims have weak legal grounds, any system that closely examines the
substance of claims of conscience and only sometimes grants exemptions is bound to 
generate controversial decisions. 
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oppose and might even satisfy with halfhearted performance or outright
sabotage.  Relative to the world that does not provide the claim of
conscience, society is better off because it receives four years of
(possibly wholehearted) service from the claimant, and the claimant is
better off because, in accord with his expressed preference, he is relieved 
of the initial burden that would have deeply disturbed his conscience.28 
To give an example similar to one posed by Greenawalt,29 suppose an
attorney at a government agency refuses, as a matter of conscience, to
work on a particular case.  As an alternative burden, the agency could 
require the attorney to work additional hours—some amount greater than
his ordinary obligations—in exchange for granting the claimant’s requested 
reassignment.  Again, the claimant is better off because the initial burden 
would have deeply disturbed his conscience, and the agency and its 
employees are better off because they get the benefit of additional labor 
that can ease the workload of other employees. 
By requiring that alternative burdens at least benefit those affected by
claims of conscience (and preferably benefit society as a whole), we
reduce the actual or perceived unfairness of respecting the claim. Other
agency employees, for example, will generally not mind that a peer has 
refused to work on a particular matter because the claimant has had to
take on some more onerous alternative burden.  Employees also know 
that they may have their own grounds for making a claim of conscience 
in the future, regardless of whether they are theists or atheists.  Moreover, 
requiring a social benefit decreases the importance of identifying sincere
and insincere claims of conscience.  Even if some insincere claimants are
granted exemptions, at least they have undertaken alternative burdens that
improve the lot of nonclaimants (and hopefully of society more 
generally).
The “social benefit” requirement also addresses the following 
objection: In a world with claims of conscience but without alternative 
burdens, people will probably be more likely to follow the dictates of 
conscience.  If we believe that following one’s conscience is generally a
good thing, alternative burdens are bad because they burden conscience.
28. I am not endorsing compulsory military service or community service as general 
policies.  I am only noting that, in a society that endorses both, community service can 
serve as a good alternative burden.  Also, when selecting alternative burdens, there may
be situations in which a person has a claim of conscience against both an initial burden 
and an alternative burden.  In some such cases, we could provide a further alternative to
the original alternative burden.
 29. Greenawalt, supra note 1, at 904–05. 
930
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A system of alternative burdens will lead some people to engage in 
activities that at least somewhat trouble their consciences.
The “social benefit” requirement weakens this criticism.  In a world 
that provides no self-interested incentives to government actors and
private employers to permit claims of conscience, they are unlikely to
permit claims of conscience except in extreme cases.  By contrast, if 
alternative burdens provide some benefits to enterprises, those enterprises
will permit claims of conscience in more contexts.  So even though 
alternative burdens discourage people from making claims of conscience
by requiring the satisfaction of alternative burdens, alternative burdens also
encourage public and private enterprises to allow people to make claims 
of conscience under a broader set of circumstances. 
There is much to consider when crafting alternative burdens.  In some
situations, there may be no appropriate alternative burden.  But in a wide 
variety of contexts, we can create good alternative burdens.  Some such
burdens may be financial.  For example, the pharmacist who refuses to
prescribe pills that induce abortion might have his salary reduced by the
amount of the pharmacy’s lost business.  Alternatively, the pharmacist
could have his salary reduced by the additional costs of hiring a part-
time pharmacist or an on-call pharmacist willing to prescribe the 
medication. 
I have argued that a system of alternative burdens should make 
nonclaimants better off, but there is much room to debate how 
demanding this requirement should be. A strong version would require 
that every instance in which an exemption is granted makes everyone 
better off than they would have been if this particular exemption had 
been denied.  A weak version would require that the existence of the
alternative burden scheme makes others better off (or at least leaves
them no worse off) even if each individual instance of granting an 
exemption does not improve everyone’s lot.
Let me illustrate the weak version of the requirement in the organ
donation context.  Currently, we allow people to withhold consent to the 
transplantation of their organs after death, even though those organs 
might someday have saved a life.  We could, however, pass a law of
general applicability requiring hospitals to salvage all cadaver organs 
that are eligible for transplantation but grant exemptions to those who
 931

























   
   
believe that organ transplantation violates their freedom of conscience.30 
Some such claims will be religious in nature, but others will not.  For 
example, some atheists may deeply and steadfastly believe that one’s
postmortem body should not be treated as government property for
purposes of redistribution. 
Regardless of whether claims are religious or nonreligious, however, 
claimants must agree to the alternative burden.  In the organ donation 
context, the burden to the claimant could consist of a loss of a benefit. 
For example, we could make it so that a person who gets an exemption
is given reduced priority to receive an organ if he should need one 
during his life.31  We could make the reduction in priority small or large 
in magnitude and have a short or long duration.
A reduction in priority to receive an organ provides the two desirable
characteristics of alternative burdens that I described.  First, such a 
system creates an onerous burden on claimants because many or most
people would think it worse to reduce one’s life expectancy through 
priority reduction than to give up organs after death that would
otherwise decay in the ground or be incinerated.  Second, the system 
creates a benefit for nonclaimants who are nevertheless affected by the 
exemption.  Though they are deprived of the potential lifesaving organs 
of claimants, they are benefited because they all have slightly higher 
priority than they would have had if we simply allowed people to opt out 
of the organ donor pool without penalty.
Under this particular scheme, nonclaimants receive a limited benefit 
when someone claims an exemption: their priority to receive an organ
increases slightly because someone else in the potential organ recipient 
pool is given lower priority.  On the other hand, depending on how the 
priority reduction is structured, nonclaimants could be worse off relative
to a world with mandatory organ salvaging that prohibits exemptions. 
Allowing exemptions means that claimants who would never contribute 
to the organ supply still have some access to withdraw organs.  On a 
probabilistic basis, each exemption reduces the expected size of the pool
of organs available to nonclaimants.  So, if we applied a strong version 
of the requirement that each instance of exemption must benefit everyone, 
this particular system of alternative burdens would fail. 
30. I take no position here on the constitutionality of such a law. The exemption 
might play an interesting and important role in the analysis.
31. I defend a similar proposal in much more detail in Adam J. Kolber, A Matter of
Priority: Transplanting Organs Preferentially to Registered Donors, 55 RUTGERS L.
REV. 671, 673 (2003). See also Adam Kolber, The Organ Conscription Trolley Problem, 
AM. J. BIOETHICS, Aug. 2009, at 13, 13–14. 
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On the other hand, it could be the case that the general requirement to 
donate one’s organs increases supply so much that it makes most people 
much better off, perhaps so much so that it drastically reduces the
shortage of transplant organs.  And if such an organ donation scheme is
only politically or constitutionally feasible by adding the ability to make 
claims of conscience, then we can meaningfully say that nonclaimants 
are better off in a world where legislation mandates organ retrieval yet 
provides an exemption on grounds of conscience.  Such a scheme would
satisfy the weak requirement by being widely beneficial as a whole, even
if it failed to satisfy the strong requirement because particular instances 
of exemption may not benefit everyone.
IV. CONCLUSION
Rather than taking on the difficult task of weighing the merits of 
individual claims of conscience—be they religious or nonreligious—we 
can establish alternative burdens in many contexts that will roughly do 
the job for us.  By doing so, we need not be especially concerned that 
people will make bogus claims of conscience.  Some claimants may
simply have deep-seated aversions to complying with a particular law,
even if their aversions do not amount to what we traditionally think of as
claims of conscience.  Whether or not we deem such claimants to be
making genuine claims of conscience is not especially important.  There 
is something to be said for not forcing people to engage in behaviors 
they find deeply aversive, especially when we can channel their energies
or resources toward alternatives that provide other more substantial 
societal benefits. So, there may be reasons to implement alternative
burdens to promote goals other than just protecting freedom of conscience.
Nevertheless, a system of alternative burdens will frequently still have 
the side benefit of promoting freedom of conscience. 
I described my alternative burden proposal at a very schematic level. 
In principle, these alternative burdens could be implemented by legislatures, 
administrative agencies, public employers, private employers, and others. 
Depending on one’s general policy preferences, the burdens can be very
onerous or relatively modest.  Similarly, the expected societal benefit
from an exemption can be big or small, widely shared or more exclusive. 
No doubt there are other desirable characteristics these alternatives could 
have that I do not discuss.  No matter the details, however, a system of
alternative burdens will often achieve important policy goals without 
 933










having to make difficult assessments of the relative merits of religious 
and nonreligious claims of conscience. 
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